

Notes from the Director

No. 42

24 April 1979

DDCI TESTIMONY ON FOIA

On 5 April 1979 Deputy Director Frank Carlucci made a hard-hitting and important public statement to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on the impact of the Freedom of Information Act on the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of the points he made were:

- We support the general concept of openness in government to give citizens greater access to government affairs.
- We question the appropriateness of applying government-wide public disclosure concepts to the secret activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Oversight of this nation's most sensitive activities ought to be limited to the Executive Branch review mechanisms and Congressional oversight committees.
- Public disclosure statutes like FOIA are seriously damaging our ability to do our job. The often-heard allegation that the CIA cannot keep a secret focuses on the FOIA. We do not agree that we cannot keep secrets, but if those who would only enter into an arrangement with us on a confidential basis perceive that to be the case, then that is the crucial issue. The barrage of intelligence disclosures is making it harder and harder for our case officers to convince sources that we can ensure that information they furnish us will not find its way into a U.S. newspaper or magazine.
- The FOIA has adversely affected our relationships with foreign intelligence services and domestic contacts as well.
- These examples demonstrate the chilling effect the FOIA has had on our ability to collect intelligence. We are seriously hampered in providing the best intelligence when we cannot guarantee to our sources that their information will be held inviolate.

The DDCI also stated that in responding to FOIA requests:

- The amount of information released is minute in comparison to the quantity of material that must be reviewed. When information is released, it is often out of context and can be misleading.
- Even requests from those who are avowedly determined to destroy the Agency must be processed. Opposition intelligence services can piece bits and pieces of FOIA releases together to form a larger picture. Mistakes, although few, have

and probably will continue to occur. CIA's compartmented record system is broken down by the pulling together of information for FOIA requesters.

- Manpower is drained by the FOIA. Some \$3,000,000 was expended for FOIA-related salaries alone in 1978. There is a massive backlog of unanswered requests.
- The erosion of our ability to protect sources and methods and, more importantly, the perception of that erosion, is the most serious problem the CIA faces today. Unless solved, we cannot continue to be the best intelligence organization in the world. If we believe we need intelligence then we have to accept some secrecy. Around the world, FOIA has called into question our ability to keep a secret.

Although I cannot promise that relief from this damaging burden is in sight, both the DDCI and myself, as well as the Legislative Counsel and officers in other components directly concerned with the FOIA, are working diligently toward that goal.

INTELLIGENCE AND SALT

Following is a statement I have authorized for release in answer to queries from the media and public concerning my role in SALT monitoring and verification:

"Verification of the SALT treaty is a policy function ultimately performed by the President of the United States with the specialized advice of many individuals and agencies. Intelligence monitoring of the treaty is only one of those inputs.

"The role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is to monitor Soviet performance with respect to the provisions of the treaty—not to judge whether an activity constitutes a violation of them. He gives his best estimate of our national capabilities to monitor the quantity and quality of the Soviet weapons controlled under the agreement. It is his responsibility to advise the policymakers on how well he can monitor each of the terms of the treaty. He will provide full detail of his estimates of monitoring capabilities to the Senate in the course of its debate. Whether the advantages of the treaty outweigh the risks is a judgment of the policymakers who submit it and the Senators who approve it, not the DCI."

KUDOS TO CARTOGRAPHY

Our fine Cartography Division received some well-deserved praise recently when it was awarded a blue ribbon and two honorable mentions in the 1979 Map Design Competition sponsored by the American Congress on Surveying and Mapping (ACSM). The blue ribbon was awarded for the maps which appear in the CIA's Polar Region Atlas, an impressive volume which many outside the Agency have praised as one of the best, non-technical publications on the Polar Regions.

The honorable mention awards were given for a street map of Central Kiev and for the black-and-white maps Cartography prepared for the recent Presidential Study Commission of Global 2000.

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390026-1

The ACSM map design competition is an annual event open to all U.S. and Canadian cartographers. This year, nearly 100 maps were entered in the contest with representation from the best mapmakers, including Rand McNally, National Geographic Society, and the U.S. Geological Survey. This is yet another area in which we can all take pride in our product. Congratulations to our skilled cartographers.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Director